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I am, as ever, delighted to be in Jackson Hole. Demographic change
and its fiscal implications constitute a significant concern for the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the international financial
institutions (IFIs) more generally.
Demographic change will affect all our member countries over the
coming decades. Of course, the problems differ greatly among indi-
vidual countries and among groups of countries. The industrial
countries will encounter the problems posed by aging populations
first: Indeed, in a very real sense, those problems are already upon us. 
All of us here are familiar with the general outline of the problem
in industrial countries. As populations age and the ratio of the elderly
to the working-age population—the dependency ratio—rises,
governments face increased budgetary pressures with rising expendi-
tures on the one hand and falling tax revenues on the other.
Pay-as-you-go financing looked very different with the demographic
situations of the 1950s and 1960s than it does with the prospectively
much higher ratios of pensioners to workers in the years ahead. 
Several of the sessions this weekend are examining the policy impli-
cations of this for industrial countries in more detail. Among the
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involved in work in this area, principally through our annual Article
IV consultations; I will say something about that work in a moment.
But the main focus of my remarks will be on another group of coun-
tries: the middle-income or emerging market economies. We do not
usually associate the problem of aging populations with these countries;
it is widely believed that they will not encounter this phenomenon until
much later than the mature economies—with the notable exception of
China where aging is taking place rapidly. But although China is a
unique case, significant aging—by which I mean a significant rise in the
elderly dependency ratio—will occur much sooner than is often real-
ized in many other emerging market countries.
And these countries are already facing formidable fiscal challenges
(that sometimes include their current social insurance financing) that
must be addressed in addition to the oncoming demographic problem.
So, these countries will confront the problems posed by demographic
change from a much weaker position than the mature economies.
Of course, demographic change will have a large impact on low-
income countries, too. But as David Bloom and David Canning
suggested this morning, there will be a rise in the proportion of the
working-age population in most low-income countries before the
problem of aging populations becomes acute, probably around 2050
for most of the world’s poorest economies.
Industrial economies
Let me start by stating the problem as we see it. As people live
longer and fertility rates drop, the elderly dependency ratio—the
number of people over 60 expressed as a proportion of the working-
age population—rises, with obvious consequences for fiscal policy.
This shift requires a fiscal adjustment if government finances are to
remain on a sustainable path. And because of the long lead times that
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action, while difficult, is important.
We already know how difficult these adjustments have been—and
are—for the industrial economies. For some years now, the Fund—
along with the Bank, the OECD and, indeed, the EU—has been
actively involved in urging mature economies to make those adjust-
ments. Our Article IV consultations regularly explore the magnitude
of the problem—which, as you know, differs quite widely even
among the industrial countries—along with policy options, such as
later retirement, higher pension contributions, taxation of retirement
income, and so on. 
Demographic change has tended to be a relatively slow process for
industrial economies. But the projected rise in dependency ratios
between now and 2050 implies apparently large fiscal adjustments for
most of them. Frederikson estimates that for 19 OECD countries,
the GDP-weighted average adjustment needed now to achieve
sustainability is more than 5 percent of GDP. Any delays will only
increase this number. 
In Germany, the Fund staff analysis suggests that age-related expen-
ditures will be around seven percentage points of GDP higher by
2050 than they are today. Governments have found it difficult to
push through reforms that will achieve much smaller adjustments
required to achieve fiscal sustainability for general government expen-
ditures. 
In some countries, reforms already undertaken have done much to
strengthen the pension system: In Canada, benefit levels have been
rationalized in the context of a major reform that privatized the
management of pension fund assets and left the system actuarially
balanced, the base used for calculating pension contributions was
widened, and contributions were raised.
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mitigate the problem. In 1980, the link between the basic state
pension and average earnings was broken, with pension increases
linked solely to prices (instead of, as was the case before 1980, being
indexed to whichever figure was more favorable to pensioners each
year). And between 2010 and 2020, the retirement age for women
will be raised from 60 to 65, the current retirement age for men. Even
so, as this year’s Fund staff analysis noted, there remains a risk that the
current policy of supplementing the basic pension with means-tested
benefits has created other pressures on the public finances that will
eventually have to be addressed.
Emerging market economies
I don’t want to underestimate the problems that industrial countries
face as they grapple with the fiscal implications of aging populations.
But they confront these issues from a position of relative economic
strength—industrial countries grew rich before they started to age,
the fiscal positions are generally stronger, and their debt levels are
mostly lower than the comparable figure for emerging markets.
Even without the prospect of aging, many emerging market coun-
tries are struggling with large fiscal imbalances. They have large
budget deficits. They have large public debt burdens that are not
sustainable over time. They already urgently need to make large fiscal
adjustments to bring their budgets back toward balance and their
public debt down to sustainable levels. They must increase their
primary surpluses to achieve debt sustainability. 
Turkey, one of the Fund’s largest borrowers, is currently running a
primary surplus of over 6 percent as part of the adjustment needed to
bring its public debt down to more sustainable levels. Brazil, currently
our largest borrower, is, as you know, pursuing a prudent fiscal policy
aimed at reducing its debt-to-GDP ratio: The government has
committed itself to a primary surplus target of 4.25 percent, which if
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end of the decade. 
Both of these countries have pressing needs for publicly financed
expenditures on infrastructure, education, health, and other items, in
addition to the need to address demographic change. 
India—not a Fund borrower—has a budget deficit in excess of 10
percent of GDP, a cause for considerable concern. Fund staff analyses
suggest that even stabilizing the debt-to-GDP ratio at 85 percent—a
relatively high level for an emerging market economy—would require
a fiscal adjustment of about two percentage points a year over the
next five years. And again, the need for increased infrastructure and
social spending is evident.
These fiscal strains come at a time when emerging market
economies face significant upward pressures on budgets. Infrastruc-
ture improvements that will boost growth performance are badly
needed—the new Indian government is firmly committed to making
significant progress in this area and to increasing social welfare spend-
ing. Yet, India’s budget is constrained not just by its deficit problem
but also, like many emerging market countries, by existing budgetary
commitments that are often poorly targeted, failing to reach those in
greatest need. In India, as elsewhere, subsidies often go to those with
relatively high incomes and result in highly wasteful use of scarce
resources—subsidies to electric power consumers are an obvious
example. In 2001, the World Bank noted that in Brazil, less than 1
percent of social security spending reached the poorest 10 percent,
while 50 percent went to the wealthiest 10 percent.
Weaknesses in the collection systems make raising revenues difficult
and the structure of taxation often acts as an incentive for people to stay
in the informal sector of the economy. Corruption both in tax collec-
tion and government spending is a major problem in many countries. 
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countries is the level of existing pension commitments. In many
cases, these are so seriously underfunded to the extent that they are
already in cash deficit. We are currently projecting the pension system
deficit in Turkey, for example, to be around 3.5 percent of GDP in
2004. The civil service pension fund has the largest deficit—it will
reach 1.8 percent of GDP in 2005. Current estimates suggest the
total public pension deficit will continue to rise, to around 4 percent
by 2030. Yet, the coverage of social insurance in that country is far
from complete.
In Brazil, the deficit of the public employees’ public pension system
is currently around 3.5 percent of GDP, and that for the private sector
employees’ public system is about 1 percent of GDP. By 2020, the
total public pension system will be in deficit by something like 4.9
percent—an actuarial imbalance of around 235 percent of GDP.
The scale of these deficits is easier to comprehend when one real-
izes how generous many schemes are. In Turkey, pension benefits are
high and qualifying periods are low. Until 1999, when reforms were
introduced, male civil servants in Turkey could retire on full pension
after 25 years of service and women after 20; and the full pension
was 75 percent of final salary, itself determined generously, plus an
additional 1 percent for each subsequent year of retirement. For
other public sector workers and employees of private sector compa-
nies, 13.9 years was enough to get you a full pension, equal to 60
percent of final salary for the first 5,000 days, with supplements
added thereafter.
In Brazil, the picture is not very different. Reforms are currently
being introduced. But public sector workers have had to work for a
minimum of only 10 years to get some sort of pension. To obtain the
full pension, which is 100 percent of final salary, men in the public
sector have to work for 30 years, women for 25. The discrepancies
between the benefits available to public sector workers and those in
the private sector are wide: In a 2001 study, the World Bank noted
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percent more pay and could look forward to pensions 75 percent
higher than their private sector counterparts. In 1999, government
spending on 21 million retirees exceeded education spending on 48
million students. 
Generous, then, and expensive to run. Pension schemes in emerg-
ing market countries tend to have very high administrative costs. In a
book edited by Marty Feldstein in 1998, Olivia Mitchell found that
administrative costs as a percentage of expenditures were, on average,
more than eight times higher for a group of Latin American and
Caribbean countries than for OECD economies. In another paper in
the same volume, Sebastian Edwards cited figures showing that the
reformed social security system in Chile, though still relatively expen-
sive, was around 42 percent cheaper than the system it replaced. 
There is a further complicating factor that, while social in origin,
has important fiscal implications. Pension systems in emerging
market economies face large deficits and running costs, partly because
of the generous nature of their provisions; but that generosity is
limited in scope. Public pension commitments to the public sector
usually cover a relatively small and privileged proportion of the popu-
lation. In Lebanon, for example, civil service and military pension
schemes covering just 3 percent of the population are the second
largest item in the budget, second only to interest payments on the
public debt.
For political and social reasons, governments will increasingly find
themselves under pressure to extend or improve pension coverage to
benefit a much wider section of the population. Improving the social
safety net is a laudable objective in human terms: Finding the most
efficient and effective way of doing so is challenging, especially given
the current fiscal position of many emerging market economies.
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The fiscal deficits we see in so many emerging market economies
need to be addressed with urgency. We have been arguing for some
time that governments should use the current favorable environment
of low interest rates and global expansion to reduce public debt levels
so as to reduce their vulnerability as interest rates rise or the world
economy slows. It is now clear that “safe” levels of debt for emerging
market countries are significantly lower than those for industrial
countries. Yet, many countries currently have debt well in excess of
the 60 percent limit that the EU views as the upper limit for its
members and are, nonetheless, incurring fiscal deficits too large to
permit the declines in debt-to-GDP ratios that are needed. 
Reforms are required on both the expenditure and revenue front.
Tax reforms can broaden coverage, reduce distortions, and cut back
evasion. Well-planned reforms can help reduce the size of the infor-
mal sector, which is, by definition, largely uncovered by social
insurance. More effective tax administrations and better-structured
tax systems can enable governments both to reduce overall tax rates
and broaden the taxpayer base. 
Demographic change will come on top of existing problems. As I
said, the pace of demographic change is more rapid than is sometimes
realized. Much of this is a direct result of rising living standards and
rapidly improving public health and medical care. 
It took a country like France about 50 years for the dependency
ratio to go from just over 30 percent (in 1950) to around 38 percent
(today). That ratio is forecast to rise to about 53 percent by 2020, and
to around 70 percent by 2050.
By contrast, India’s dependency ratio was only 12.45 percent in
1950; but it grew marginally more rapidly, to reach around 16 percent
today; it is projected to reach 20 percent by 2020 and around 37
percent by 2050. That isn’t so surprising given the dramatic improve-
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most emerging market economies in the past 50 years. According to
the UN, life expectancy in India was just under 39 years in 1950; it is
now around 62 years and is forecast to rise to 66 years in 2015 and 70
years by 2035. Fertility rates have fallen from just under 6 in 1950 to
below 3 now and are currently forecast to fall below 2 in 2035. As an
illustration of what this means for the government’s pension liabilities,
the number of retiring civil servants is expected to increase from 2.73
million in 1999 to around 5 million by 2010.
For Korea, the figures are even more striking. Life expectancy has
risen by even more since 1950, by 27 years to India’s 23 years. And
Korea will have one of the most rapidly aging populations, with the
Korean government projecting a dependency ratio (using over 65 as
a definition of elderly) rising from about 12.1 percent now to 21.3
percent in 2020 and 62.5 percent in 2050. 
Korea’s pension system is currently in surplus, but it faces a
dramatic reversal over the coming decades. The pension system
recorded a surplus of around 2 percent of GDP in 2002, but without
reform that surplus will decline modestly until 2020 and then fall
sharply, turning into a deficit of around 7 percent of GDP by 2045. 
The path to reform
Just as in the case of the industrial countries, the Fund’s Article IV
surveillance provides an important means for reminding emerging
market policymakers, especially in those countries that do not have
Fund-supported programs, of the need for reform. Tackling the
problem of fiscal imbalances in emerging market economies requires
sound pro-growth macroeconomic policies to be in place. 
Pension reform is often a vital element in developing an appropri-
ate fiscal strategy, because of the current underfunding of generous
pensions. Pension systems in many developing countries often have
inconsistent objectives, because of the piecemeal way they have devel-
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they often have a negative impact on labor markets because of the
distortions and work disincentives that often result, and they fail to
support—and in some cases actively hinder—the development of
financial markets.
Both the Bank and the Fund’s Fiscal Affairs Department work
closely with many emerging market governments in providing tech-
nical assistance to develop and implement durable pension reform.
The Bank also provides financial support for such reform: Between
1989 and 2003, it provided 138 loans to 60 countries where pension
reform was an important component.
I mentioned the efforts that countries like Brazil and Turkey are
making to ensure that their budgets and debt levels are sustainable.
These countries have also introduced reforms aimed at bringing
pension costs under control. The 1999 reforms in Turkey increased
the statutory retirement age to 60 years for men and 58 for women
(though the change is being phased in slowly). A man with 23 years
of service or a woman with 18 years of service as of 2002 can retire at
44 and 40 respectively. Pensions are to be indexed to inflation in
future, rather than wages. But in practice, further reforms will be
needed to contain costs. Replacement ratios are still about 75 percent.
The minimum contribution period is still low: just 10 years to receive
a pension equal to 35 percent of the reference wage. And there is, of
course, a very long transition period for the changes: five years after
the 1999 reforms, over 60 percent of current pensioners are still
below the new retirement ages being phased in. The current govern-
ment has twice raised pensions by more than the rate of inflation.
The Turkish government is currently planning further major
administrative reforms of its social security system—including the
unification of the three existing pension systems—that are expected
to save about 3 percent of GDP annually. But further parametric
reforms are needed, including accelerating the increase of the retire-
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replacement rates.
Pension reform is also a key component of the Fund-supported
program in Brazil. In 2003, the government made significant adjust-
ments to the civil service pension system. These included the taxation
of the benefits of retirees; a ceiling on benefits (with some grandfa-
thering); the creation of defined contribution complementary
pension schemes for new civil servants; an increase in the retirement
age, with penalties for early retirement; and a change to the base for
calculating benefits.
The actual savings delivered by these reforms are still small. In
Brazil, even if all the changes are implemented, they would save about
0.2 percent of GDP, compared with the current deficit of 5 percent.
This represents a net present value saving of around percent of GDP,
compared to the actuarial deficit of around 235 percent of GDP. 
Healthcare
I have focused on pension reform because, as I explained at the
outset, underfunded pension systems threaten to undermine efforts
to achieve fiscal sustainability in many emerging market countries.
But the rapidly rising cost of healthcare clearly has implications for
developing as well as developed countries in the context of aging
populations, with exactly the same comparisons: Current health
needs are great so that increasing access to health care is urgent.
In the industrial countries, this is already a problem requiring urgent
attention—for both state-provided and insurance-based medical care
systems. The cost of healthcare has on average risen by 1 percent a year
more than GDP for the past 40 years. But there have also been rapid
developments in medical technology—responsible for some of the
rising costs—many of which have helped extend life expectancy.
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healthcare costs appear less severe, simply because far fewer countries
have comprehensive medical care systems. But technological advance
still has an impact on the cost of care in developing countries, both
in terms of increasing life expectancy—and thus the aging problem—
and in terms of the costs of provision. And this is all from a base with
much less coverage. Governments will come under increasing pres-
sure to extend healthcare provision, with obvious consequences for
expenditures.
Looking to the future
Each country faces unique problems in coping with demographic
change. But much can be learned from the experience of others and,
as I said, the IFIs can act both as policy advisers and disseminators of
information. The aim should be to enable policymakers to benefit
from the lessons of experience in other countries and to persuade
them to act to prevent even larger problems at a later date. 
Coordination at the institutional level is therefore important. Both
within and among institutions, we need to ensure that work is
complementary and not competing. We in the Fund have tended to
concentrate on the macropolicy aspects of these issues, such as fiscal
reform, while the Bank has focused more on the details of pension
reform—even though the Fund often legitimately becomes involved
directly in pension reform.
Conclusion
Industrial countries will be the first to encounter the problems that
an aging population will pose for macroeconomic policy in general
and fiscal policy in particular. Most have taken or are taking steps to
ensure fiscal stability at a time when changing life patterns will place
enormous strain on the financing of pension and healthcare systems.
These are formidable challenges, not least because of the uncertain-
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economic response to changes in population structure. 
But the challenges facing industrial countries pale beside those that
emerging market economies will encounter. Most of these countries
are starting from a much less comfortable base position. They are
grappling with fiscal and other macroeconomic pressures that would
be daunting even without demographic change. The challenges will
not ease as populations age—quite the reverse. They do not have the
breathing space that the delayed demographic changes might imply.
They need to take remedial action now to establish much sounder
fiscal positions at a time when the global economic environment is
unusually benign.
The IFIs are well placed to help. The Fund’s very wide membership
and the involvement of Fund staff in the demographic problems of
industrial countries have ensured that we have acquired substantial
expertise in this area. We now have a much better understanding both
of what fiscal priorities are needed in the emerging market countries
and, in the area of pension reform, what priorities are needed for
durable, equitable social insurance in the coming decades. 
We can alert them to the problems they face; we can offer advice on
how to respond; we can try to cajole them into prompt action; we can
warn of the consequences of delay. The challenges are huge. Ulti-
mately, though, it is for the policymakers and citizens of emerging
market countries to confront the challenges they face.
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